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Abstract—The Bitcoin system only provides eventual consis-
tency. For everyday life, the time to confirm a Bitcoin transaction
is prohibitively slow. In this paper we propose a new system, built
on the Bitcoin blockchain, which enables strong consistency. Our
system, PeerCensus, acts as a certification authority, manages
peer identities in a peer-to-peer network, and ultimately enhances
Bitcoin and similar systems with strong consistency. Our exten-
sive analysis shows that PeerCensus is in a secure state with high
probability. We also show how Discoin, a Bitcoin variant that
decouples block creation and transaction confirmation, can be
built on top of PeerCensus, enabling real-time payments. Unlike
Bitcoin, once transactions in Discoin are committed, they stay
committed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its inception in 2008, the Bitcoin [25] cryptocurrency
has been steadily growing in popularity. Today, Bitcoin has
a market capitalization of about 5 billion USD. The Bitcoin
network processes transactions worth approximately 60 mil-
lion USD each day.
So, how usable are Bitcoins in everyday life? While one
certainly can buy a coffee with Bitcoins, a Bitcoin transaction
is shockingly insecure when compared to a cash (or credit
card) transaction. Cash is exchanged on the spot with the
coffee, and credit card companies are liable for fraud attempts.
Bitcoins are different, as the Bitcoin system only guarantees
“eventual consistency”. The barista will serve a coffee in
exchange for a signed Bitcoin transaction by the customer.
However, a signed Bitcoin transaction is no guarantee that the
Bitcoin transfer really takes place.
In order to get a better understanding, let us follow the
path of our Bitcoin transaction. First, the barista will inject
the signed transaction into the Bitcoin network, which is a
random-topology peer-to-peer network. The correctness of the
signature will be immediately verified by the peers that get
the transaction. Next, the transaction will be flooded within
the Bitcoin network, such that all peers in the Bitcoin network
have seen the transaction. Eventually, the transaction will be
included in a block, and finally the block will end up in
the blockchain.
While the problem of fraudulent customers also exists
with cash or credit cards, Bitcoins allow fraud on a whole
different level. The main issue are so-called double-spend
attacks [5], [17]. Our coffee consumer may simply spend
the same money multiple times. In addition to signing the
transaction for our barista, the customer may concurrently sign
another transactions spending the same Bitcoins but with the
customer himself as beneficiary. While the barista is injecting
her transaction into the Bitcoin network, the customer is
injecting his transaction into the Bitcoin network as well,
quickly and with as many peers as possible. Both the original
and the double transactions will spread in the Bitcoin network,
but the double-spend was injected at multiple vantage points,
so it will spread more quickly. A professional fraudulent
customer will manage that the double-spend transaction is
orders of magnitude more present in the Bitcoin network than
the original transaction. As such the double transaction will
be much more likely to end up in a block, and ultimately in
the blockchain.
The problem is that the barista cannot verify the whole
process in real time. While injecting a transaction into the
Bitcoin network, and the verification of the signature by the
first peer is a matter of seconds, all the other steps in the
process take time. Flooding transactions in a network already
is an operation which may take minutes, and a block is only
generated every 10 minutes [25]. However, with the current
backlog,1 it is unlikely that a transaction will be in the next
block. Rather, a few blocks might be generated before our
transaction (the original or the double) managed to be selected
in a block, so for a low-value transaction like the payment of a
coffee we can expect a delay of about 30 minutes. In addition
there is the problem of so-called blockchain forks [12], i.e.,
two conflicting blocks may generated at roughly the same time,
and only subsequent blocks will determine which of the blocks
is part of the blockchain and which one is discarded. Each
subsequent block takes another 10 minutes, so in order to know
that a transaction is confirmed, we may need to wait for several
hours. The Bitcoin system is a prime example of eventual
consistency: Eventually Bitcoin has a consistent view of the
transactions, but one can never be sure, and it may always
happen that a blockchain fork will destroy a substantial amount
of transactions, sometimes even multiple hours later [1].
Because of this we argue that the current version of Bit-
coin is fundamentally flawed when it comes to real time
transactions, where goods or services are instantly exchanged
for Bitcoins. How long should our barista wait until she is
sure that the transaction will eventually be in the blockchain?
Waiting for more confirmations does reduce the probability of
the transaction being reverted, but how safe is safe enough?
When should the seller release the goods or service to the
buyer? Most vendors are probably unaware of this tradeoff
between safety and time. In order to use Bitcoin for real
1https://blockchain.info/unconfirmed-transactions
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time exchanges, we need to completely abandon the weak
concept of eventual consistency and instead embrace strong
consistency.
In this work we propose PeerCensus, a system upon which
strongly consistent applications can be built. The basic idea is
that Bitcoin’s blockchain can be used to introduce and manage
identities that participate in the system.
More precisely, PeerCensus uses the blockchain as a way
to limit and certify new identities joining the system. This
yields strong guarantees on the assignment of these identities
to entities participating in it. We stress that PeerCensus is
application agnostic, i.e., it does not manage any application
specific information. A single PeerCensus instance may be
shared by an arbitrary number of applications. In particular
PeerCensus can be used to introduce strong consistency in
Bitcoin. For easier readability, we call the strongly consistent
Bitcoin that uses PeerCensus Discoin.
Discoin does not rely on its own blockchain. Instead, it
can rely on a byzantine agreement protocol [8], [18], [19]
to commit transactions to the transaction history, effectively
decoupling block generation from transaction confirmation and
thus enabling safe and fast transactions. Once a transaction
is committed it cannot be reverted at any future time, a
property we refer to as forward security. This is in contrast to
Bitcoin, where confirmations are slow and can be reverted by
a sufficiently strong attacker.
Our approach is also significant in light of the recent
proliferation of alternative digital currencies, the so-called
altcoins, all reliant on their own blockchain. The creation of
altcoins has had the effect of splitting resources among many
blockchains, resulting in many smaller and consequently more
easily attackable blockchains. PeerCensus, with its shared in-
stance, allows the computational resources to be concentrated
to a single blockchain, strengthening it against attacks.
Moreover, PeerCensus enables experimental versions of Bit-
coin to test protocol changes at a smaller scale before merging
them with the main network. This is an alternative to the
approach of [4], which instead suggests to allow transactions
between otherwise separate blockchains.
The security guarantees of PeerCensus are extensively ana-
lyzed in Section V, where we show that with high probability
the system does not fail. Furthermore, we outline how the
current Bitcoin system can be migrated to Discoin running on
top of PeerCensus, gaining strong consistency and real-time
payments as a result. Migrating resources and blocks from
Bitcoin allows us to maintain the momentum and the public
acceptance Bitcoin has gathered over the years. Our proposed
migration method results in an instance of PeerCensus that in
expectation fails fewer than once every 7 million years.
II. OVERVIEW
Our main objective is to enable the creation of a cryp-
tocurrency that provides forward security and supports fast
confirmations. We accomplish this goal by leveraging tech-
niques from Bitcoin as well as byzantine agreement protocols,
resulting in strong consistency guarantees. Known agreement
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Fig. 1. The layout of the components and information flows.
protocols are not applicable to a peer-to-peer environment in
which Bitcoin operates, for three reasons: Openness, Sybil
Attacks, and Churn.
• Openness: The set of peers eligible to participate in the
protocol changes over time, but previous protocols rely
on a fixed set of participants.
• Sybil attacks: Entities may participate in the protocol with
an arbitrary number of identities, effectively disrupting
voting based agreement protocols.
• Churn: Peers may join or leave the system at arbitrary
times, therefore the quorum size required for agreement
cannot be constant.
Typical voting based agreement protocols, like PBFT [8]
and Zyzzyva [18], require knowledge of the membership:
Before proceeding, the protocol must determine whether a
sufficient number of participants voted. This requirement is
in stark contrast to the openness of a peer-to-peer setting.
Moreover, allowing unrestricted entry of new peers to the
system creates the potential of Sybil attacks. In a Sybil attack,
a single entity poses as an arbitrary number of peers (by
generating fake identities) and joins the system as distinct
participants in order to subvert the system. While the issue
of churn has been addressed by previous agreement protocols
(e.g., Secure Group Membership Protocol [28]), to the best of
our knowledge Sybil attacks are left unaddressed by traditional
agreement protocols.
Bitcoin introduced a novel use of Proof-of-Work systems,
namely a blockchain data structure, as a mechanism to deal
with the problems caused by openness. But in Bitcoin states
can temporarily diverge, since each peer applies incoming
operations to its local state without reaching any kind of
agreement beforehand. As a result, Bitcoin only guarantees
eventual consistency, a property that is questionable for a
protocol that is supposed to handle financial transactions.
In PeerCensus we combine those approaches to obtain
the best of both worlds: Resilience to Sybil attacks and
strong consistency. Correspondingly, PeerCensus consists of
two core components: the Blockchain (BC) and the Chain
Agreement (CA).
The Blockchain’s purpose is to mitigate Sybil attacks. This
is achieved by regulating the rate at which identities gain
privileges within the system, and by ensuring that those
privileges are not obtained by a single entity. Peers are either
non-voting or voting peers. In particular, new peers start as
non-voting until promoted to voting by appending a block to
the collaboratively maintained blockchain. The rate at which
blocks can be found in the network can be regulated so that
new identities are promoted at a fixed rate, currently every
10 minutes. Furthermore, the share of identities an entity may
control converges to the share of computational resources it
controls in the network.
The Chain Agreement on the other hand augments the
system with strong consistency. By virtue of the voting rights
issued from the Blockchain, a byzantine agreement protocol
can be used. The CA’s task is twofold. One task is to track the
system membership, i.e., which identities are currently online
and participating. This ensures that a voting based agreement
protocol such as PBFT can function correctly.
The other task is to resolve conflicts in case of a blockchain
fork, i.e., if multiple blocks are proposed for extending the
blockchain, then only one of them will be committed. Us-
ing standard agreement protocol techniques we immediately
obtain strong consistency. PeerCensus guarantees that with
high probability, an entity can only subvert the agreement if
it controls a sufficiently large share of all resources.
Applications built on top of PeerCensus may rely on the
guarantees about the identity distribution and the membership.
To demonstrate how simple it is to build strongly consis-
tent applications on top of PeerCensus, we introduce a new
cryptocurrency called Discoin. Because of the PeerCensus
foundation, Discoin itself can rely on classical byzantine
agreement protocols to atomically confirm transactions. Trans-
actions are proposed to the primary in Discoin, which assigns
sequence numbers to them and attempts to commit them to
the transaction history. Since transactions are totally ordered,
double-spends can be resolved locally, and upon committing
all peers agree on a common transaction history.
Compared to the current Bitcoin system, Discoin and the
underlying PeerCensus system have several advantages:
• A small blockchain since blocks only contain a single
identity.
• Blockchain forks are resolved immediately when they
occur.
• Confirmations are decoupled from blocks, enabling real-
time confirmations.
• Since PeerCensus tracks the participating identities, Dis-
coin can distribute rewards and transaction fees to all
participants instead of just the block finder.
Ultimately, PeerCensus not only enables the creation of
strongly consistent, but also simpler applications, by abstract-
ing the dynamic membership.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
The setting in which PeerCensus operates consists of the
following three components: a) a peer-to-peer system, b) the
notion of controlling entities, and c) the notion of computa-
tional resources at an entity’s disposal. The role of the peer-
to-peer system is to execute the PeerCensus protocol, whereas
a controlling entity models an individual, possibly having
control over several peers. A Proof-of-Work (PoW) mechanism
(see Section IV-A) controls the entry rate of peers to the
system to mitigate Sybil attacks. In particular, the amount of
PoWs a controlling entity e can generate, and thus the number
of peers controlled by e entering the system, is dictated by the
amount of (computational) resources at e’s disposal.
a) Peers and Identities: We denote by P the set of peers
that may join the network. The identities (IDs) of peers are
established using public-key cryptography as follows: When a
peer p ∈ P joins the network for the first time, p generates a
public-/private-keypair. The identity of peer p is its public key
(or a derivative thereof). We assume that there is no collision
among the IDs chosen by the peers—in practice this is ensured
by the assumption that obtaining the private key from the
public key is computationally infeasible. We do not require
that IDs are ordered, and the outcome of PeerCensus does not
depend on the IDs chosen by the peers.
The system evolves in discrete unit time steps. At any given
time, a peer p ∈ P may either be online or offline, and we
refer to the set of online peers at time t by P (t) ⊆ P . Offline
peers may join the network at arbitrary times, whereas online
peers may leave the network by either halting (voluntarily) or
crashing (involuntarily) at any time.
Peers communicate via message passing in a point-to-point
network. This could either be viewed as having a completely
connected communication graph, or by relaying messages
among participants. We simply assume that between any two
online peers there is a channel which eventually delivers all
messages. The authenticity of every message is ensured by
signing it with the sender’s private key.
b) Controlling Entities: The notion of collusion and con-
trol sharing among multiple peers is formalized by introducing
controlling entities. Each peer p is assigned to exactly one
entity e which controls its behavior. The goal of e is to steer p,
hoping to maximize the entity’s utility, i.e., entities are selfish.
c) Resources: In order to model computational limita-
tions of entities, we introduce the notion of a computational
unit-resource, or resource for short. The set of unit-resources
that will ever participate in the system is denoted by R,
and R(t) ⊆ R is the set of active resources at time t.
Every resource in R is associated to exactly one entity which
owns it. All unit-resources are thought to possess the same
computational power, and the more resources are active for
an entity, the more computational tasks can be solved by
that entity.
Similarly to peers, resources may exit the system voluntarily
or because of failure. We assume that the failure and recovery
probabilities of unit-resources are independent from their
assignment to an entity.
IV. DYNAMIC MEMBERSHIP PROTOCOL
In this section we present the PeerCensus protocol which
provides a trustless decentralized certification authority for
identities. The PeerCensus protocol consists of three layers,
namely
• the Blockchain (BC) layer,
• the Chain Agreement (CA) layer, and
• the Application (APP) layer.
We now turn to describing each layer separately, starting
with the Blockchain, which is based on a Proof-of-Work
mechanism.
A. Blockchain (BC)
Proof-of-Work Mechanisms: An integral tool used in
the Blockchain protocol is a so called Proof-of-Work (PoW)
mechanism. This concept was introduced by Dwork and Naor
in [14]—we only give a brief overview in this subsection. The
key insight behind PoW mechanisms is that that the resources
needed to solve computational puzzles are not easily acquired
and may not be scaled at will.
A function F(d, c, x)→ {true, false}, where d is a positive
number, and c and x are bit-strings, is called a PoW function
if it has following properties:
1) F(d, c, x) is fast to compute if d, c, and x are given, and
2) for fixed parameters d and c, finding x so that
F(d, c, x) = true using a unit-resource is distributed
with exp(1/d), i.e., computationally difficult but
feasible.
We refer to the parameters d, c, and x as difficulty, chal-
lenge, and nonce, respectively. For example, F might return
true if and only if the output of some cryptographic hash
function to the concatenation x|c starts with at least d zeroes.
The PoW mechanism issues a difficulty and a challenge pair
(d, c). A nonce x for which F(d, c, x) = true is called a Proof-
of-Work for (d, c). In our model, computational resources are
required to find such an x. We assume that no entity has an
unfair advantage in finding a PoW. Furthermore, we expect
the PoW mechanism to automatically adjust the difficulty2
between consecutive (d, c) pairs so that the expected time for
any resource to find a PoW for (d, c) is some constant τ .
The Blockchain Protocol: The blockchain is a collabora-
tively maintained list whose function is to throttle joins of new
identities to the CA protocol by employing a PoW mechanism.
A single block in the blockchain has the form
b = 〈h, d, p, x〉,
where h is a hash value, d is a difficulty, p ∈ P is a peer,
and x is a bit-string. We denote by H the hash function
used to calculate h. A blockchain consists of a sequence
C = (b1, . . . , bl) of blocks, and a genesis block b0 that
is fixed in advance. From here on, we assume the system
implementation provides an agreed-upon genesis block.
For i ≥ 1, block bi = 〈h, d, p, x〉 is said to be legal if
h = H(bi−1), and
F(d, 〈h, p〉, x) = true,
that is, if the hash in bi is obtained from bi−1, and bi is a
Proof-of-Work. For a legal block bi, the block bi−1 is called
2The PoW mechanism used by Bitcoin accomplishes this (cf. [25]).
the parent of bi, and bi is a child of bi−1. A blockchain is
legal if every non-genesis block is legal.
Since the blockhain is based on a PoW mechanism it is
ensured that new blocks cannot be appended to C at will.
Attempting to find a legal block that extends the current
blockchain is called mining. We encapsulate this process in
the procedure mine(b), which for peer p attempts to find a
block with parent b that includes p’s identity.
Note that legal blocks together with b0 form a tree rooted
at b0 due to the parent/child relation, and a legal blockchain
corresponds to a path in the tree starting at the root. In order
to provide forward security, it is necessary that once the peers
agree on a blockchain C, they will never accept a blockchain
that does not have C as a prefix. To tackle this issue, whenever
the blockchain is extended the CA protocol is used to ensure
that all peers agree on the same extended blockchain. In
particular, the BC protocol relies on the propose_block
operation provided by the Chain Agreement.
If the Chain Agreement protocol accepts the block proposed
by peer p, then the identity of p becomes voting. In that case
the resources allocated to p’s mining process by the controlling
entity of p may be assigned to a new identity. If on the other
hand a block containing a different peer is accepted, then p
continues mining and proposes the next block it finds. Refer
to Fig. 2 for a pseudo-code description of the BC protocol.
Protocol: Blockchain, from the perspective of peer p
Initialization:
C ← the current Blockchain, obtained from CA
trigger Start event
On Event Start:
b← the newest block in C
mine(b)
On Event mine (b) returns block b∗:
propose_block(b∗) using CA
On Event CA commits a block a:
stop mining
C ← the new blockchain from CA
if a 6= b∗ then
trigger Start event
Fig. 2. The Blockchain Protocol.
B. Chain Agreement (CA)
While the blockchain introduces new identities into the sys-
tem, the Chain Agreement tracks the membership of currently
participating identities in the system. For our CA protocol we
adapt SGMP [28] and the PBFT [8] agreement protocols. In
particular, the goal is to keep track of some shared state that
can be modified by certain predetermined operations. In our
case, the shared state encompasses an operation log O, a set
of online voters I , and the blockchain C.
As in SGMP and PBFT, the life cycle of an operation op
begins with op’s proposal. The proposal is sent to the primary,
i.e., to a specific peer determined by an agreed-upon scheme.
Given that op is valid and the peers decide to commit it, op is
applied to the shared state. Both agreement protocols rely on
the notion of totally ordered logical time stamps, and in each
such time step exactly one operation is committed. A logical
time stamp is a triple (`, v, s), where ` is the current length of
C (i.e., the blockchain contained in the shared state), and v and
s are positive integers referred to as the view primary number
and sequence number, respectively. Logical time stamps are
ordered in lexicographic order.
To determine the primary we introduce the notion of a peer’s
rank. For a fixed blockchain C = (b1, . . . , b`) and a voting
peer p let i denote the index of the block in which p appears.
The rank of p, denoted by rank(C, p), is `− i, i.e., peers are
ranked by how recently the right to vote was obtained. Note
that the rank is well defined since a peer can acquire the right
to vote only once.
Consider a time stamp (`, v, s) and the associated
blockchain C of length `. The peer p with rank(C, p) = v
(mod `) is chosen as the primary, i.e., the peer who accepts
operation proposals for the next time step. We use the failover
mechanism of PBFT to ensure that v is increased without the
help of a primary in case the current primary fails.
Using the logical time stamps and the rank as fixed above,
the underlying SGMP/PBFT agreement protocols can be used
to implement Chain Agreement. Note however that due to
churn, just like SGMP, CA cannot support a snapshot mecha-
nism. This is in contrast to PBFT where the set of participating
peers is fixed in advance and snapshots are supported.
Operations: The Chain Agreement uses a standard
byzantine agreement technique, in which each operation has
to go through the stages propose, pre-prepare, prepare, and
commit before it is applied. More specifically, operations are
initially proposed to the current primary q. The task of q is
to assign consecutive time stamps to proposed operations.
For each proposal, q then sends out pre-prepare messages,
receives prepare messages, and commits the operation once
q received a sufficient amount of prepare messages from
peers in I . Recall that in each step, authenticity of messages
is guaranteed due to signatures offered by the public key
cryptography system.
What is left in the Chain Agreement specification are the
operations mutating the shared state. The Chain Agreement
protocol relies on the following three operations:
• block(b) is used to append a new block b to the
Blockchain, thus promoting the peer contained in b to
be promoted to voting.
• join(p) is used by a previously offline voting peer p to
re-join the set I of online voters.
• leave(p) is used to remove offline peers from I .
We need to explicate two aspects of each operation, namely
how the operation validated, and how committing it affects
the shared state. Validation occurs at the primary when an
operation is proposed, and at other nodes upon receiving a
Specification: Operations for Chain Agreement
Shared State:
O . The operation log
I . The set of online voters
C . The blockchain
t = (`, v, s) . The logical time stamp
Validate block(b):
b′ ← the newest block in C
if b is a child of b′ and b is legal then
return valid
else
return invalid
On Commit block(b):
Append block(b) to O
Append b to C
〈h, d, p, x〉 ← b
I ← I ∪ {p} . Promote p to voting
`← the length of C . Update logical time stamp
v ← 0
s← 0
Validate join(p):
Send a ping message to p
V ← the set of peers appearing in the blocks of C
if p ∈ V , p 6∈ I , and p replies to the ping then
return valid
else
return invalid
On Commit join(p):
Append join(p) to O
I ← I ∪ {p}
Validate leave(p):
Send a ping message to p
if p ∈ I and p does not reply then
return valid
else
return invalid
On Commit leave(p):
Append leave(p) to O
I ← I \ {p}
Fig. 3. Operations of the Chain Agreement Protocol
pre-prepare message for that operation. This is to ensure that
a faulty/malicious user cannot modify the shared state in an
undesired manner. Whenever an operation is committed, peers
append the operation together with its assigned time stamp and
collected commit signatures to the operation log and update
their new time stamp accordingly. Furthermore, committing
an operation may modify the shared state according to the
operation’s purpose. We now describe both aspects for each
operation separately and refer to Fig. 3 for a pseudo-code
description.
Recall that proposals for a block b are sent to the Chain
Application
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Fig. 4. Application client communicating with the application.
Agreement only from the Blockchain layer. To validate a
block(b) operation, all peers check that b is indeed valid and
extends the current blockchain C. To commit this operation
b is appended to C, and the time stamp is set to (`, 0, 0),
where ` is the new blockchain length. This results in the block
finder becoming the new primary, with the previous primary
as backup.
A join operation consists of the joining peer p. To validate
a join, peers check whether p is indeed reachable over the
network. In that case, the operation will be committed and p
is included in the set I .
Peers rely on a failure detector to detect when identities
left the system, e.g., by sending ping messages in regular
intervals. Should one peer detect a failure of another peer p, a
leave operation on behalf of p will be emitted. A leave(p)
operation is validated by checking whether p indeed failed, to
keep malicious peers from removing online peers. When the
operation turns out to be valid, it is committed by removing
p from I .
C. Application
The application layer makes use of the membership infor-
mation from the CA in order to implement the application
logic. The CA provides a ranking among identities, the current
membership as well as its timestamp, which enables the
application to use the full capabilities of PBFT. This includes
the use of snapshots of the application state.
The application has some shared state and deterministic
operations that modify the state. Operations are totally ordered
by assigning a timestamp (t, o) to them, where t is the
membership timestamp from the CA and o is an operation
sequence number assigned by the current primary.
The application logic and state is encapsulated in the
application layer and does not influence the decisions in the
CA. A single instance of the CA and the BC can therefore be
shared among any number of applications.
Applications may export functionality to clients that are
not participating in the application agreement, like depicted
in Figure 4. Clients synchronize with the CA in order to get
the membership information. The synchronization consists of
downloading the CA operation and incrementally applying it
to the membership. The clients then submit operations to the
application, which in turn processes them. Using the member-
ship information, the clients then verify the confirmation that
the operation was processed correctly.
V. SAFETY & LIVENESS
We would like to lift the safety and liveness guarantees
provided by PBFT [7] and apply them to our Chain Agree-
ment. An agreement protocol provides safety if operations on
the shared state are committed atomically, i.e., as if they were
applied on a single sequential machine; An agreement protocol
provides liveness if all proposed valid operations are eventually
committed. The premise under which PBFT provides both is
that less than one third of the participants are not faulty.
In our setting participants in the protocol are modeled as
peers, whereas participants in the system, i.e., a individuals
with an agenda to subvert the protocol, are modeled as entities.
In order to lift the guarantees from PBFT to Chain Agreement,
we need to ensure that at any time t, less than one third of the
online voters (the set I in the CA) are controlled by a single
entity. Since SGMP ensures that I tracks the voters in P (t)
(with some delay depending on the message delays and failure
detector speeds, cf. [28]), it is sufficient to investigate how
P (t), and in particular the voters therein, evolves over time.
To state this formally, let A be a malicious entity referred
to as attacker. To simplify the analysis, we denote by D a
meta-entity that encompasses all entities that are not A. For
some fixed point in time, let I be the set of online voters. We
denote by IA, and ID the corresponding partition of I into
online peers controlled A, and D, respectively. We can apply
the classic positive results for byzantine agreement due to
Lamport [26] if it holds that |IA|/|I| < 1/3. This is equivalent
to ensuring that
φI :=
|IA|
|ID| < 1/2 .
Therefore, as long as the inequality remains satisfied we
say that PeerCensus is in a secure state. On the other hand,
Lamport’s work also established that no guarantees can be
made should the inequality be exceeded. Correspondingly,
when the inequality is violated we say that PeerCensus is in
an insecure state.
What are the consequences of being in an insecure state?
First observe that A can cement its control by not committing
block or join operations, thus hindering peers controlled by
other entities from being included the online voter set. The
effect for the application layer is that new operations are
only applied at A’s will. Note however, that past committed
operations cannot be modified or undone by any attack on the
protocol, i.e., strong consistency up to the time when A took
control is still guaranteed.
Our analysis relies on the system being in its steady state,
i.e., that the number of online peers and resources is governed
by the respective expected value. This is the case if PeerCensus
was active for a sufficiently long time. Later in Section V-C we
show that this assumption is justified due to a bootstrapping
method. Before describing the procedure in detail, we now
turn to establishing our following main theorem.
Theorem 1. Let φR denote the fraction of resources asso-
ciated with A over resources not associated with A, and let
0 <  < 1/2 be a constant. If PeerCensus reaches a steady
state and φR < 1/2− , then PeerCensus is in a secure state
with high probability.
To prove Theorem 1 we separately consider the three
factors that influence the cardinalities of IA and ID, namely
membership churn, resource churn and miner’s luck.
• Resource churn: Resources fail and recover, thus limiting
or enhancing the attacker’s capability to introduce new
peers to the voter set.
• Membership churn: Voting peers fail and recover, directly
affecting IA as well as ID.
• Miner’s luck: A stochastic block mining process deter-
mines who gets to introduce a new peer to the voter
set. With non-zero probability, an attacker’s resources
may mine more blocks than expected, thus increasing PA
disproportionately.
A. Preliminaries
In the steady state, resource churn is characterized by a
parameter ρ in the following way. The state of an individual
resource is modeled as a two-state Markov-Chain with the
transition matrix (
1− p p
q 1− q
)
,
where p and q denote the probability of a resource to fail
or recover, respectively. The two states indicate whether the
resource is currently active, or inactive. For a single resource,
the stationary distribution is (ρ, 1−ρ), where ρ = q/(p+q). We
conclude that in the steady state the expected number of online
resources is ρ|R|, since resources fail or recover independently
from one another.
Lemma 1. Let φR be the random variable representing the
ratio of online resources for A to online resources for D. In
the steady state and for α ∈ (0, 1/2) it holds that
Pr
[
φR ≥
(
1 +
2α
1− α
)
r
]
<
(
exp(α)
(1 + α)1+α
)ρnr/(1+r)
+
(
exp(−α)
(1− α)1−α
)ρn/(1+r)
,
where n is the cardinality of R, and r is the ratio of A’s
resources to D’s resources in R.
Proof: Denote by RA∪˙RD = R the partition of R into
resources belonging to the attacker A and defender D. For
i ∈ RA, let Xi be the 0/1 random variable indicating whether
resource i is online. Correspondingly for j ∈ RD, let Yj
be the 0/1 random variable indicating whether resource j is
online. Let X and Y be the corresponding random variables
denoting the sum of Xi and Yj . Note that in the stationary
distribution, the expected value of X and Y are ρ|RA| and
ρ|RD|, respectively.
With these definitions φR = X/Y . Since X and Y are
independent it holds that E[φR] = E[X]/E[Y ] = r. Our goal
is to bound the probability that φR deviates from its expected
value by bounding the probability of X and Y deviating from
their expected values. Applying the Chernoff bound (see, e.g.,
[24]) to X and Y yields that
Pr[X > (1 + β)ρ|RA|] <
(
exp(β)
(1 + β)1+β
)ρ|RA|
, and
Pr[Y < (1− γ)ρ|RD|] <
(
exp(−γ)
(1− γ)1−γ
)ρ|RD|
for any β > 0 and 0 < γ < 1. Let X(β) and Y(γ) denote
the two events from above, i.e., that X resp. Y deviates from
the corresponding expected value by (1 + β) and (1− γ).
Let Z denote the event that φR > (1 + 2α)r, i.e., the event
from the statement, and consider positive values β and γ such
that β + γ = 2α. If neither X(β) nor Y(γ) occurs, then also
Z does not occur. By applying the union bound we obtain
Pr[Z] ≤ Pr[X(β) ∨Y(γ)] ≤ Pr[X(β)] + Pr[Y(γ)] .
We bound the above by applying the previously obtained
Chernoff bounds for X(β) and Y(γ). Doing so yields
Pr[Z] <
(
exp(β)
(1 + β)1+β
)ρ|RA|
+
(
exp(−γ)
(1− γ)1−γ
)ρ|RD|
.
This resulting sum is minimized if β = γ, i.e., α = 2β/(1−β).
By observing that |RA| = nr/(1 + r) and |RD| = n/(1 + r)
the proof is completed.
Lemma 1 bounds the impact of resource churn. Our next
goal is to do the same for membership churn. To that end, sim-
ilar to the discussion above, we characterize the membership
churn in the steady state by the constant σ = ppr/(ppr+ppf ).
Lemma 2. Let φI be the random variable representing the
ratio of online voters for A to online voters for D. In the
steady state and for α ∈ (0, 1/2) it holds that
Pr
[
φI ≥
(
1 +
2α
1− α
)
s
]
<
(
exp(α)
(1 + α)1+α
)σns/(1+s)
+
(
exp(−α)
(1− α)1−α
)σn/(1+s)
,
where n is the cardinality of I , and s is the ratio of A’s peers
to D’s peers in P .
The above lemma can be established using the same tech-
niques as in the proof of Lemma 1. We therefore omit the
proof here. Note that the parameter s in Lemma 2 is directly
affected by the outcome of the block mining process. Before
establishing our main theorem we thus derive bounds on the
miner’s luck of the attacker in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let φB be the random variable representing the
ratio of A’s blocks to D’s blocks in the blockchain. In the
steady state and for α > 0 it holds that
Pr[φB ≥ (1 + α)t] ≤
(
exp(α)
(1 + α)1+α
)`t
where ` is the current length of the blockchain, and t is the
fraction of A’s resources in R.
Proof: Let Xi be the 0/1 random variable indicating
whether the attacker found block i, and let X denote its sum.
It holds that E[X] = `t, since the resource that found block i
is drawn uniformly at random from the online resources, and
in the steady state a t-fraction of those belongs to A. By the
Chernoff bound,
Pr[X ≥ (1 + α)`t] ≤
(
exp(α)
(1 + α)1+α
)`t
.
Since `φB ≥ X , the probability of the event `φB ≥
(1 + α)`t is upper bounded by the same term. Dividing by
` concludes the proof.
Note that the expected value of φB is not t—it rather de-
pends on the resource distribution between A and D. Suppose
that E[φB ] = u, and set α = (uα′− t+u)/t for some α′ > 0.
Since α′ > 0 implies α > 0, we may apply Lemma 3 to obtain
the following technical corollary, which is the last building
block for our proof of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. Let φB be the random variable representing the
ratio of A’s blocks to D’s blocks in the blockchain. In the
steady state and for α′ > 0 it holds that
Pr[φB ≥ (1 + α′)E[φB ]] ≤
(
exp(α)
(1 + α)1+α
)`t
where ` is the current length of the blockchain, t is the fraction
of A’s resources in R, and α = (E[φB ]α′ − t+ E[φB ])/t.
B. Establishing Theorem 1
Let  < 1/2 be a positive constant. The goal is to show
that if φR < 1/2 − , then with high probabilitythe Chain
Agreement is in a secure state. To that end, consider the
complementary event T that the CA reaches an insecure
state. We establish the claim by showing that T occurs with
probability at most exp(−Ω(min(|R|, |I|, `))), where R, I ,
and ` are as above.
Let α, β, γ be positive constants with α + β + γ = . We
would like to use Lemma 1, 2, and Corollary 1 to obtain the
result. To apply those three we perform a worst case analysis:
Consider the event U that after reaching the steady state,
φR, φB , or φI deviate from their expected value by more than
α, β, or γ, respectively. Note that U occurring is necessary,
but not sufficient, for T to occur.
Event U corresponds to the occurrence of at least one of
the events bounded in Lemma 1, 2, and Corollary 1. Thus,
applying the union bound to U yields
Pr[T] ≤ Pr[U] ≤ Pr [φR ≥ (1 + α)E[φR]]
+ Pr [φB ≥ (1 + β)E[φB ]]
+ Pr [φI ≥ (1 + γ)E[φI ]] .
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Fig. 5. Bitcoin block finder distribution as of blockchain height 333,000 for
the 25 most prominent mining pools.
The statements of the two lemmas and the corollary can
now be used to bound the three corresponding terms. This
concludes our proof of Theorem 1.
C. Reaching the Steady State
The security of the system hinges on it starting in a steady
state, i.e., that there are a sufficient number of resources,
voting identities and online peers. For example should no
identity have been promoted yet, then the first block finder
controls all identities in the system, trivially subverting the
system. A bootstrapping period is used to ensure a large
enough initial number of resources and voting identities set,
resulting in good bounds on the failure probability. In order
to reach a steady state it is necessary to bootstrap the system
in a controlled way. Bootstrapping consists of determining a
genesis block, an initial set of voting identities and an initial
set of online identities.
PeerCensus can be bootstrapped by retrofitting the Bitcoin
blockchain, providing the initial resources, blocks (voting
identities) and peers. Every block in Bitcoin contains a reward-
transaction, transferring a fixed amount of newly minted
Bitcoins to the block finder. In order to receive the Bitcoins,
the block finder has to include a Bitcoin addresses in the
transaction. This enables us to derive the new voting identity
from the block by extracting the Bitcoin address from the
reward transaction.
To migrate from Bitcoin to PeerCensus a migration time in
the form of a blockchain length lm is determined in advance.
Garay et al. [16] showed that with high probability peers
agree on a common prefix, with distance k from the current
blockchain head and that the blockchain of length j is a rep-
resentative sample of online peers with high probability. Upon
receiving a valid block for blockchain length lm, peers extract
the identities from blocks [0, lm−k]. The Bitcoin genesis block
is also the PeerCensus genesis block. The initial set of online
identities is then assumed to consist of the last j identities,
i.e., the identities included in blocks [lm− k− j, lm− k]. The
parameter j should be chosen small enough so that d2j/3e+1
identities are online to guarantee liveness, but large enough to
ensure diversity in the entities. Once the set of voting and
online voting identities are determined, peers start executing
the PeerCensus protocol. The peers then incrementally commit
blocks at heights [lm − k, lm].
The migration requires that in Bitcoin’s current blockchain
there is no entity that has mined a sufficient number of blocks
to take control of the system. Fortunately, many mining pools
include identifying hints in blocks, e.g., reusing the same
address or including a text banner, so that the blocks can
be attributed to the pool. This allows us to determine the
block finder of a large percentage of blocks found so far in
the blockchain. Figure 5 shows the current shares of blocks
found by mining pools and therefore their share of identities
in PeerCensus. Even if the largest 28 pools were to collaborate
they would not reach a sufficient share of blocks to take control
of the system. Furthermore, with j ≥ 10, 000 there is no single
entity that controls more than 25% of identities, securing the
migration itself.
D. Real World Guarantees
The previous subsections established that with high prob-
ability the system does not fail, for increasing number of
resources and identities. In this section we give an example of
the guarantees that are to be expected in real world instances
of the PeerCensus system. In order to gauge the probability of
a failure of the system we need to estimate some parameters
used in the analysis.
For the resources we need to determine a maximum ratio of
resources an attacker is allowed to control 25% which results
in a security margin of  = 1/2 − 1/3. Notice that this is
equivalent to the 13 largest mining pools colluding to subvert
the system according to Figure 5. The number of resources
is estimated as 1, 000, 000, which at the current computa-
tional power in the Bitcoin network of 274, 000, 000GH/s
(Gigahashes) would mean that a unit resource has 274GH/s,
which matches the currently available ASIC mining hardware.
The number of blocks in the system is estimated as 350, 000
blocks, matching the Bitcoin blockchain length. The number
of peers that are online in expectation is estimated at 25, 000
peers. Furthermore we adopt a conservative mean time be-
tween failures of 99 days and a mean time to recovery of 1 day
for resources and peers, resulting in ρ = σ = 0.99. Applying
Theorem 1 using these parameters yields the following upper
bound on the failure probability of
Pr[PeerCensus is in a secure state] ≥ 1− 4.26 · 10−15
in one time interval. Notice that this results from subdividing
the security margin  as 2αR = 14%, αM = 11% and
2αI = 75%. If the system proceeds in discrete time intervals
of 1 second, then the system therefore is expected to fail fewer
than once every 7 million years.
Specification: Discoin Transaction processing
Shared State:
B . Account balances
Validate transaction(〈a, b, v〉σ):
if σ is valid signature by sa and B[a] ≥ v then
return valid
else
return invalid
On Commit transaction(〈a, b, v〉σ):
B[a]← B[a]− v
B[b]← B[b] + v
Fig. 6. Discoin protocol
VI. DISCOIN
In the following we present Discoin, a cryptocurrency, as an
exemplary application built on PeerCensus. Discoin tracks the
balances of accounts, denominated in coins. An account a is
associated with a public-/private-keypair (pa, sa). The public
key pa is used to identify the account, while the private key
sa is used to authenticate messages.
The shared state in Discoin consists of account balances B.
In order to transfer coins between accounts we define a
transaction tx = 〈a, b, v〉σ . A transactions describes a transfer
of v coins from source account a to destination account b and
includes signature σ by the private key of a to authorize the
transfer. A transaction is valid if the source account’s balance
B[a] ≥ v, the signature σ correctly signs 〈a, b, v〉 and matches
the public key of a.
Discoin has a single operation transaction(tx) which,
if committed, applies the transaction to the account balances.
Upon committing a transaction(〈a, b, v〉σ) operation the
value is subtracted from the source account’s balance and
added to the destination account. Finally, Discoin distributes a
reward of r newly generated coins each time a block is found.
The r coins are distributed in equal parts to each identity
i ∈ I . This reward is triggered by the timestamp change and
does not necessitate a new transaction. By using PBFT we are
guaranteed to process the transactions in the same order. The
peers agree on the validity of individual transactions and on
the current balance of each account.
Compared to Bitcoin, Discoin features a much leaner and
simpler protocol. Unlike Bitcoin which tracks transaction
outputs, we explicitly track account balances which results in
a smaller shared state and a more intuitive concept of account
balances. Committing a transaction is independent from the
block generation and, more importantly, once transactions
are committed they stay committed. By distributing rewards
among all participants instead of just the block finder, Discoin
continuously incentivizes peers to participate in the network.
This contrasts Bitcoin’s all-or-nothing rewards, which incen-
tivize the creation of mining pools which pool resources and
distribute the reward. Mining pools are seen as single points
of failure in the Bitcoin ecosystem [15], [23], [29], [30].
As with the bootstrapping of PeerCensus, the accounts
from Bitcoin can be migrated to Discoin. Once PeerCensus is
bootstrapped, Discoin can be bootstrapped by computing the
account address balances up to Bitcoin’s blockchain height
lm. A snapshot of the balances is then committed before
proceeding with the Discoin protocol and committing new
transactions.
VII. RELATED WORK
The study of byzantine agreement protocols was initiated
by the seminal works by Lamport et al. [19], [26], establish-
ing tight feasibility results. PeerCensus and Discoin rely on
byzantine agreement protocols that later improved message
complexity, e.g., PBFT [8], Zyzzyva [18] and SGMP [28].
Bitcoin [25] is the latest, and most successful, in a long
series of attempts to create a decentralized digital currency
initiated by DigiCash [9] and ECash [10] by David Chaum.
Recent work by Garay et al. [16] and Miller et al. [22] has
shown that, with high probability, the peers participating in
the Bitcoin network eventually agree on a transaction history.
Reaching consistency however is a slow process as blocks are
counted as individual votes for the validity of a transaction
and confirmations are never final. Committing blocks in the
CA resolves blockchain forks [12] early, rather than deferring
the resolution to a later time, shown by Garay et al. [16] to
be inefficient.
Today, a multitude of altcoins, i.e., alternative cryptocurren-
cies [20], [31] and so called Bitcoin 2.0 projects [6], [11], [21],
[33], are being used, each one using their own blockchain.
This splits available resources and mining efforts, weakening
the individual blockchains. Back et al. [4] proposed two-way
pegged sidechains as a way to allow altcoins to be pegged to
Bitcoin and to trade among altcoins, however each altcoin still
has the burden of securing their own system via a blockchain.
Rosenfeld [29] analyses the difficulty of fairly distributing
rewards among mining pool participants. Pools have become
powerful entities often acting selfishly [3]. Eyal and Sirer [15]
show that a mining pool may increase its share by not pub-
lishing blocks immediately. Miller [23] propose an alternative
proof of work mechanism that would not allow pools to form.
Schwartz et al. [32] describe how consensus in Ripple is
achieved by unique node lists assumed not to collude. Main-
taining the node lists however requires manual configuration
in order to avoid sybil attacks.
PeerCensus solves problems arising from inconsistent state
views, such as double-spendings [5], [17]. It does not address
problems like transaction malleability [13] and privacy issues,
e.g., [2], [27].
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